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STABILITY AND DYNAMISM: PRESIDENTIALISM
OR PARLIAMENTARIANISM: EXECUTIVE AND
LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS
Lloyd N. Cutler
My assignment, according to the program, is presidentialism or
parliamentarianism. As I understand the discussions in CODESA,
(Convention for a Democratic South Africa), this topic does not mark
one of the burning issues, so I will try to put the issue of separation of
powers into a relevant South African context. Within CODESA, as I
understand it, the Nationalists, the African National Congress (ANC),
and the other parties are in general agreement on a number of basic
principles: that there be a written and entrenched constitution; that the
constitution contain a bill of rights and an independent judiciary with
the power to set aside legislation and government actions which violate
the constitution; that there be a one person, one vote system; a separation of executive and legislative powers; that there be an elected constituent assembly empowered to write the constitution, subject to conformity of the final constitutional document with the basic principles now in
process of negotiations; and that there be some form of judicial review
of the final constitutional document to determine whether those basic
principles had in fact been observed.'
I understand that, in recent weeks, you have moved to the point
where there may be agreement, or something close to agreement, on
turning this constituent assembly from a constitutional convention into a
legislative form of constituent assembly which would be the legislature
of an interim government, and that the interim government, in one way
or another, would be an all party government. As to how that interim
government would be constituted, I believe there is still a deadlock
within CODESA.2

* Former Counsel to the President of the United States.
1. See Albie Sachs, A Bill of Rights for South Africa: Areas of Agreement and
Disagreement, 21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 13, 20 (1989) (defining the areas of
agreement between the government and the African National Congress concerning
constitutional reform).
2. See Fred Bridgland, ANC CRACK-up, NAT'L REV., OcL 1992, at 24 (discuss-
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I also understand there is still disagreement as to the structure of the
legislative upper house, and as to the structure of the ultimate executive
power, whether it should be a single executive, as exists in most countries, or a plural executive including representatives of more than one
party? There are also unresolved issues as to whether you should have
a unitary government, a federal government with member states, or a
three tier government including a third level of regions within states. I
also take it that a basic concern of those who have power today, the
white community and to some extent, the colored communities, is to
achieve more than merely judicial protection of the fundamental individual rights and any group rights that will be incorporated into your ultimate bill of rights. The great concern is whether, under a one-man, onevote system, the minority parties are to have some form of legislative or
executive blocking power over legislative or executive action, in addition
to the normal right to challenge such actions in the courts.4
In the field of legislative protection, the Nationalist Party has proposed an upper house which would be comparable to the United States
Senate, in the sense that its concurrence with legislation is absolutely
required.' Accordingly, the Nationalist Party would have more than
delaying power as its concurrence would be necessary for legislation.
Under the Nationalist proposal, the representation in the Senate would
be equal for each state or region. But for any state or region, its representation would be shared equally by all the parties that exceed some
minimum percentage, say 15 to 20 percent of the popular vote.

ing the disagreement between the African National Congress and the government concerning the formation of an interim government); see also Rick Lyman, Mandela Cuts
Off Talks, Negotiations were Suspended to Protest the Massacre, PMLADELPMIA INQUIRER, June 22, 1992, at Al (commenting that efforts to form an interim government have failed in part because of a disagreement between the government and the
African National Congress as to the shape and duration of the interim phase).
3. See Conor O'Brien & Patrick Cruise O'Brien, Better but not All Better, ATLANTC,
July 1992, at 72 [hereinafter O'Brien, Better but not All Better] (noting the
Nationalist Party's proposals for a new constitution and the African National
Congress' reaction to these proposals).
4. See de Klerk across the Rubicon, EcONOMIST, Mar. 1992, at 45 (describing
reasons behind the National Party's objection to a one-man, one-vote system); see
also Charles Villa-Vincencio, Whiter South Africa?: Constitutionalism and Law Making, 40 EMORY L.J. 142, 148 (1991) [hereinafter Villa-Vincencio, Whiter South Africa?] (presenting the government's arguments against majoritarian rule in South Africa).
5. See O'Brien, Better but not All Better, supra note 3, (outlining the Nationalist Party's proposal for an upper legislative house designed to protect minority
interests).
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In effect, it is a double protection: both a regional system, and within
the region, equal representation for each party that obtains a significant
minority of the popular vote. The first of these protections resembles the
great compromise reached in the Philadelphia Convention on the United
States Constitution. This compromise found that the lower house, the
House of Representatives, would be elected on the basis of population,
and the upper house would have equal representation from each of the
states. Originally, the legislature of each state had the right to elect the
two senators from that state, but early in the twentieth century, we
adopted the Seventeenth Amendment providing for the direct popular
election of Senators.' But we cannot amend our Constitution to give
each state a number of senators in proportion to its population. In Article Five of our Constitution there is a permanent provision stating that
there can be no amendment affecting the equal suffrage of any State in
the Senate without the consent of that State, whereby the equal representation of each state in the Senate is embedded into our Constitution.7
Constitutional lawyers can argue that this does not forbid an amendment
of Article Five, the amending article, simply to eliminate the paragraph
that forbids an amendment changing the equal representation of the
states. Since it would take a two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress,
plus ratification by three-fourths of the states (38 states) to amend the
Constitution, it is highly unlikely that this provision for equal suffrage
in the Senate will be amended."
However, we have no United States counterpart for the proposal to
give the significant minority parties in the Senate equal representation
with the majority party. Indeed, I do not know of such a precedent in
any democratic constitution anywhere.
Now, what I have to say about the executive may also be outdated.
When I was in South Africa last April, I believe the Nationalist Party
proposal was for a plural executive rather than a single executive, to be
structured so that each of the parties achieving a significant minority or
majority percentage of the vote would be a member of the plural executive.9 The chairmanship, or presidency, or whatever it would be called,

6. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIL

7. U.S. CONsT. art. V.
8. The 26 smallest states have only 14 percent of the population, yet in the
Senate, they can out-vote the other 24 states which comprise 84 percent of the pop-

ulation.
9. See O'Brien, Better but not All Better, supra note 3 (describing the Nationalist Party's proposal for a collective executive with three to five members).
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would rotate annually, and the plural executive would operate on a
consensual basis.
On this issue, some aspects of our Philadelphia Convention may be of
interest. One of the plans submitted to the Philadelphia Convention, the
New Jersey plan, provided for a plural executive of just that type, but
was rejected in favor of a single executive. Two principal reasons can
be cited for its rejection. First, there is the hesitation and deadlock that
can arise with a plural executive if its members disagree, particularly if
the executive must operate on the basis of unanimity. Second, there is
the problem of accountability. If there is a plural executive which cannot agree, it is difficult for the voters to know whom to blame. In the
Federalist Papers, these objections were summed up in Hamilton's Paper
No. 70.
"It is evident from these considerations that plurality of the Executive
tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities they can have
for the faithful exercise of any delegated power: first, the restraints of
public opinion, which lose their efficacy, as well as on account of the
division of the censure attendant on bad measures among a number, as on
account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and secondly, the
opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of
the persons they trust, in order either to effect their removal from office,
or to their actual punishment in cases which admit of it." 1"
If we had a plural executive in the days of Watergate, which Sam
Dash told you all about, whom among them would have been impeached? It seems ironic that the Nationalist Party, which adopted a
constitution providing for a single elected executive, should now be
saying that under the South African Constitution as it now exists, the
elected executive has too much power, and, therefore, there ought to be
a plural executive more representative of all of the elements of the
population." Suppose that when only the white community could vote,
there was a plural executive consisting of one representative of the
Nationalist Party and one of the Conservative Party. Under such circumstances could Mr. de Klerk ever have accomplished what he has managed to accomplish if he had been simply a member of a plural execu-

10. THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
11. See Villa-Vincencio, Whiter South Africa?, supra note 4, quoting Albie Sachs,
Toward Bill of Rights for a Democratic South Africa, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 289, 294 (1989) (stating that South Africa has been governed under the
principles of majoritarianism (white majority rule) since 1910 and majority rule is
now being attacked because the majority party promises to be black).
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tive?
Our Constitution says, incidentally, that the executive power shall be
vested in "a President of the United States," not vested partly in the
Department of Defense, or Department of State, or Department of the
Treasury, but wholly in the President of the United States. The energy
and decisiveness and indeed, the accountability of a single executive, are
enormously important to the ability of the government to act, even
though when you have a single executive with all the executive power,
you must have a system of checks and balances, such as the one our
Constitution contains. The appropriations and authorizations the executive needs to carry out his policies can be refused by the Congress. The
President may even be impeached by the Congress, and all his actions
and those of his subordinates are subject to being overruled as arbitrary
and unconstitutional by the independent judiciary.
I believe that the real objective of the plural executive, as well as the
proposed membership structure of the Senate, is to enable the minority
parties to block the majority party's proposals. The major reason for all
of this is that those with property and political power today are unwilling to rely solely upon the protections afforded by a bill of rights, an
independent judiciary, and the rule of law. They feel the need to build
some protections by blocking power into the structure of both the legislative and the executive branches. Underlying this concern is the fear
that a new majority party, long suppressed and never before allowed to
vote, will have the power to amend the constitution whenever the courts
find the majority's actions unconstitutional, and to take away whatever
protections the courts' interpretation of the bill of rights has afforded to
the former ruling minorities in the country.
That is a quite serious concern, especially when the new majority has
never voted before, has genuine grievances against prior regimes, has no
experience in running a national government and national economy, and
has almost no experience in the give and take of democracy. As long as
the majority party has sufficient power to amend the constitution, the
bill of rights and the independent judiciary may prove meaningless,
unless they are fully entrenched and cannot be amended out of existence; or unless, as a result of years of practice in cohabitation, in living
together, and in learning how democracy really works, amending the
constitution to undo a bill of rights decision of the independent judiciary
is something that no government would be willing to do.
This appears to be your basic dilemma in arriving at your constitution: how to create blocking power for minority parties at the legislative
or executive level or both; or alternatively, how to guard against future
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amendments of the constitution that would undo decisions of your independent judiciary protecting the rights of minorities. This is the central
issue you have to work out. I do not know of a country-I think a
number of you who are political scientists have pointed this out-in
which power is being transferred from a minority racial group to the
majority racial group, in which the rights of the minority have been
fully protected. There are some very good constitutional provisions that
grant such protection in the Namibian Constitution which many South
Africans helped to draft. It is an admirable constitution from that point
of view, but we have not yet seen a country that has successfully made
this transition.
You also have the problem of a majority party being able to do what
we in the United States refer to as court packing. When President Roosevelt felt frustrated by a series of Supreme Court decisions holding
several New Deal economic measures unconstitutional as invading individual property and contract rights protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, the solution he finally arrived at was to propose legislation increasing the number of members of the Supreme Court from nine
to fifteen so that he would be able to appoint six additional members
and change the balance of the court. The public outcry was so strong
that the Senate, even with its large Democratic majority, rejected the
plan.
There is also the problem you heard about this morning in the discussion between Judge Higginbotham and Charles Cooper-how an
elected president or an administration of one party, if in office long
enough, can change the entire character and outlook of a court from that
of the Warren Court of twenty to thirty years ago to that of the current
Rehnquist Court. It is a risky business to pick new justices on the theory that they are going to follow your own political persuasions and your
own views as to how controversial constitutional issues should be resolved.
Many presidents have made mistakes in their selection of justices.
Theodore Roosevelt appointed Oliver Wendell Holmes and was terribly
disappointed when Holmes narrowly interpreted Roosevelt's anti-trust
laws. President Eisenhower supposedly was asked to describe his biggest
mistakes while he was President, and he said there were two: one was
Earl Warren and the other was William Brennan, two of his appointments to the Supreme Court. There is also the famous story of President
Lincoln concerning the Supreme Court's four-four split on the legality
of the Legal Tender Law, a Civil War law that authorized the printing
of paper money. The case was to be re-argued after Lincoln filled a
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vacancy on the Court. Lincoln wrote to a friend about whom he would
appoint: "We dare not ask the man how he would vote, and if he
should answer us, we should despise him for it, therefore we should
pick someone of whose views we are absolutely certain." He then
picked his own Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase, who proposed the Legal Tender Law and lobbied it through Congress. But in
the outcome, Chase cast the fifth and deciding vote holding the Legal
Tender Law unconstitutional.
The problem of how to entrench the bill of rights and an independent
judiciary is a difficult one. In a society where power is being transferred
from a minority racial group to a majority one, and all of the property
is in the hands of the minority group negotiating the transfer of its
power, it is understandable why this problem is so difficult. I have one
suggestion, which is based on what I understand to be the agreement
already reached, that might help to resolve it. The final constitution
must conform to the basic principles which you are now negotiating
within CODESA, and should this issue ever arise in the future, some
form of judicial tribunal will be set up to resolve that issue in some
binding way. Assuming that you are able to do that, it might be possible to provide, in your ultimate constitution, that the constitution also
cannot be amended in a way that goes beyond the fundamental principies agreed in CODESA. Should this issue arise at some future date, it
would be within the competence of your own independent judiciary, or
possibly an independent judicial body which includes some international
representatives, to resolve the issue with binding effect. In this way, the
power of future amendment would be limited so as to prevent future
amendments from transgressing the basic principles to which you are
now agreeing.
The German Constitution has a provision of this type. Further, it has
a very fine and elaborate bill of rights, both what we call basic human
rights and also economic and social rights. There is a provision that no
future amendments can alter the basic principles of any of those entrenched rights (or the federal structure of the government). 2 You will
also recall the similar provision of the amending article of the United
States Constitution, Article V, that no future amendment may change the
equal suffrage of any state.
To give assurance to the minority populations which are about to
transfer power, I would suggest that you also consider expanding the
judicial tribunal that would resolve the issue of whether a future
12. GRUNDGESEIZ [Constitution] [GG] art 79 (F.R.G.).
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amendment violates the entrenching clause so that the tribunal has some
international members. Over the years, the United Nations and the
World Court have been strong supporters of the efforts to end apartheid." Suppose you incorporated a provision in your final constitution
that when an issue arose as to whether a future amendment goes beyond
the fundamental principles of the agreed constitution, the tribunal to
review that issue would include one, two, or some other number of
members who are present members of the World Court, to be designated
by the President of the World Court or the Secretary General of the
United Nations. In that way, you would have some external participation
in the review of whether or not the challenged future amendment transgressed the agreed fundamental principles. That sort of external participation can no longer be characterized as a violation of traditional national sovereignty, now that all of the nations of democratic Western
Europe, and recently the new democracies of Eastern Europe, have
signed the European Convention on Human Rights and have accepted
the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, which can hear
the claims of an individual citizen of any member nation that actions of
his own government have violated his fundamental human rights as set
forth in the Convention.
I would like to offer two other observations. One is how important it
seems to me that the remaining outstanding constitutional issues be
resolved while Mr. Mandela and Mr. de Klerk are still around. The risk
that you will fall apart if anything happens to one or both of them
before agreement is reached is too great. The moment ought to be
seized, if you can possibly seize it, while they are both still exercising
significant power.
The second observation finds that the best hope for a South African
future in which power moves democratically and peacefully from one
government to another lies in the future development of the ANC. We

13. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276,
1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21) (discussing the actions the United Nations would pursue in
order to resolve this matter); G.A. Res. 23, U.N. GAOR, 42nd Sess., Supp. No. 49,
U.N. Doec. A/42/49 (1987); Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa,
GA. Res. 50, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doec. A/43/49 (1988)
(reaffirming the United Nations support of the people of South Africa in their struggle against apartheid and demanding dissolution of the apartheid system); G.A. Res.
27, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 113, U.N. Doec. A/44/49 (1989) (calling
upon the United Nations Secretary-General to strengthen its activities against the policies and practices of apartheid).
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must all hope that the ANC adheres in practice to its principle that it is
open to the members of all races; that it is not a racially based party.
We must also hope that the ANC, like all other parties in democratic
countries which have huge majorities, splits over time into one or more
factions oriented along economic or other policy lines rather than along
racial lines. That is the only way a genuine, non-racial, two- or threeparty system can develop in South Africa, and the only way voters can
democratically transfer power from time to time from one party to another.

